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UTOPIC RENUNCIATIONS, “UNITY IN DIVERSITY”: 
THE CONTEMPORARY, FOUCAULT, BATAILLE AND PROBLEMATICS IN 
POSTMODERN HISTORICAL THEORY 
 
Ben Dorfman, Ph.D., History1 
 
Keywords: Utopic, dystopic, postmodern, souverainité, difference 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper focuses on comparisons of Michel Foucault’s and Georges Bataille’s visions of histories as 
centered around thematics of the utopic, dystopic and difference. Positing that contemporary events 
(the intifada, the “war on terrorism”) force us to face the possibility of a dystopic turn in relation to 
ideas of difference in contemporary or “postmodern” history, I suggest that Foucault and others in the 
milieu of the postmodern historical theory are unable to help us consider this turn from the perspective 
of philosophy of history. Bataille, however, I argue, can. The difference comes in the idea of the 
meaning of the renunciation of the utopic, and whether or not that is an act based in a vision of the 
utopic itself. For Foucault it is; for Bataille it neither is not, nor should it be. This gives us perhaps a 
better analytical tool for understanding turns in contemporary history, as well as suggests a truly 
radical reformulation within the domain of philosophy of history. 
 
I. 
The postmodern age seems to have taken a strange turn lately. That is not to say that it was 
ever completely “normal” but it seemed that through 1990s, more of us were beginning to 
believe the talk of liberation that had always come with postmodern discourse. In defining the 
postmodern project, Lyotard asked us in 1982 to “activate the differences” that had always 
existed among us but modernist discourses would deny.2 Perhaps we had; it was possible the 
fall of the Eastern Bloc appeared to be a last step in a progressive post-colonial flowering of 
the post-War era. Of course, people in the former Yugoslavia would attest to the problems 
accompanying this “flowering.” However, we also should remember the enormous sense of 
liberation that came in the wake of 1989-91. In this sense, at least in the West, we often 
seemed willing to take “trouble spots” as trouble spots. Increasing numbers of us, it appeared, 
                                                 
1 Benjamin Dorfman was a visiting Ph.d. candidate at SPIRIT, Aalborg University, Denmark in the fall 
of 2001.  
2 J-F Lyotard, “What is the Postmodern?” in The Postmodern Explained, tr. Julian Pefanis and Morgan 
Thomas (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 16. 
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believed – as Vaclav Havel predicted we would – that the world had found a greater “unity in 
diversity.” 3 The idea was, in short, that it was a better, more democratic place after 1989.  
 The first cracks in this post-Cold War positivism might be seen to have come with the 
renewal of the intifada in September 2000. Wherever one places the blame for this, it is 
certain that the Oslo Accords had been a major piece in the puzzle of the new “unity in 
diversity.” The more or less peaceful coexistence of Israelis and Palestinians was important 
for indicating the possibility of the successful sustenance of not only diverse, but also even 
traditionally opposed, identities within the same geographical region. That is to say that they 
indicated that the multiculturality advocated in most postmodern discourses might work. But, 
as events show, perhaps it might not. Of course, the September 11 attacks ratcheted-up the 
tensions along lines of cultural difference (at least in racial, ethnic and religious terms). Left-
wingers might decry Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis; in terms of his 
pejorative attitude toward non-Western civilizations, they are right to do so.4 However, he is 
clearly on target in the observation that we have such a clash. I hope that we can recover a 
sense of “unity in diversity.” For the time being, though, diversity – which, I think, is 
essentially to say cultural difference – appears to make us edgy and have become reshrouded 
in an atmosphere of tension and violence. 
 For historical theoreticians in the postmodern vein (which I consider myself), this turn 
in recent events brings out certain tensions that have always lay at the heart of postmodern 
historical thought. These boil down to the idea that, on one hand, postmodern theories of 
history have always been intriguing because they dispensed with historical utopias. That is to 
say that the absence of Hegelian Absolutes and Marxian Communist Utopias allowed history 
to happen. Certainly, Hegel and Marx certainly saw conflict as central to history. However, 
conflict was always tinged by senses of necessity and temporariness – simple stepping stones 
to our final historical destination. “The History of the World is not a theater of happiness,” 
wrote Hegel, yet the “vast congeries of volitions, interests and activities [that] constitute 
[conflict are] the instrument and means of the World-Spirit for attaining its object.”5 As 
Foucault wrote, such ideas gave us the feeling that what was important was not events and 
experiences themselves, but “a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of 
events or runs in its empty sameness throughout history.”6 It was hard to imagine history’s 
                                                 
3 Vaclav Havel, “The End of the Modern Era,” The New York Times, 1 March 1992, sec. 4. 
4 See S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations? (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 
5 G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, tr. J. Sirbee (New York: Dover, 1956), 25-6. 
6 M. Foucault, “Truth and Power,” in Power/Knowledge, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 
1980), 117. 
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turn toward the dystopic under such a model. Postmodern thought seemed in that manner to 
fill in the blanks. 
 On the other hand – and all Rankian protests aside – historians have a hard time not 
being philosophers.7 This is a point that Hayden White made well in the 1970s, and 
postmodernism was reassuring in this regard. 8 Postmodern historical thought offered the 
possibility that there was meaning in dispensing with the transcendental historical subject. 
That meaning was the recovery of the immanence of experience, the uniqueness of the event 
and the opening of the historical field to possibility, resistance and non-conformity. Thus, 
while we might engage in a scholarship under a postmodern paradigm that was (to use 
Foucault’s terms again) “gray, meticulous and patiently documentary,” this was only so from 
methodological and narratological perspectives. 9 Grayness, meticulousness and patience did 
not mean a lack of meaning and purpose in historical writing. Utopia could thus be both 
present and not in the historian’s work and vision of the world. Historians could downplay 
utopia to the extent that it would not become an analytical straightjacket. Yet they could 
maintain enough of it to make writing history something other than a matter of mundane 
record. It was a good situation to be in. 
 In our current global situation, however, all bets on utopia seem to be off. Indeed, if 
we are to take official discourse seriously, they will continue to be off for the next few years – 
we have been warned that the “war on terrorism” will be a long, painful process. 
(Negotiations for international support for an invasion of Iraq will probably take several 
months just in themselves.) As history seems to have taken a turn toward the dystopic, we 
have an occasion to think about the role of the utopic in historical thought. Generally, I want 
to do this for two reasons. First (1), we seem to have experienced another moment of utopia’s 
ideological resurgence and historical defeat. This seems to be the history of many utopian 
visions overcome by war a violence; why does this happen? If we are to come to terms with 
both historical reality as well as our cultural, political and existential possibilities, it is 
important to think about at what points we maintain and release utopias from historical 
discourse. At what point do we allow ourselves the dystopic, and why? What effects does the 
sustenance of the utopic within our visions have? Second (2), historical discourse (both 
                                                 
7 Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886). Generally considered the father of modern historical studies and 
the source of its turn toward scientific standards of objectivity and away from literature and letters. 
8 See H. White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). 
9 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, tr. Sherry 
Simon and Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), 139. 
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academically and popularly conceived) is one of the chief discourses by which we know 
ourselves. Generally, we have known ourselves under the aegis of utopic (modernity) 
historical discourses. Postmodern historical discourses – or at least “theories of history” – 
would supposedly disrupt such discourses. However, as indicated in the last paragraph, this 
may not be completely the case. Though surely not utopic in Hegelian or Marxist senses, 
postmodern visions of history may have their own logic of historical improvement, meaning 
that if not maintaining visions of utopia, they are touched with the utopic.  That is to say that 
while they may not envision the perfect society as such, they function under certain 
teleologies and ideas of the approximation of perfection. However, as we will see – and as 
suggested above – the situation is more complicated than that. Postmodern ideas about history 
may not differ that drastically from its modernistic conceptions. This may be a problem not 
only for thinking history in general, but also for thinking the history of the postmodern age in 
terms of its immediate past and unfolding future. 
 
II. 
It is perhaps worth noting that “historical theory,” or “historical thought,” are not the most 
precise terms. Generally, they are somehow a blending of historiography – usually defined as 
the history of historical writing – and philosophy of history – which is defined variously, but 
the most well-known branch of which is speculative philosophy of history. “Speculative 
philosophy of history” usually means the attempt to create general, metaphysical laws about 
the past that translate into general laws on human change over time. Some of the most famous 
examples of this are Hegel (the dialectics of Spirit), Marx (class conflict), Oswald Spengler 
(organic rules of rise and decline and cultural “soul”) and Arnold Toynbee (cyclical historical 
evolution); one might make an argument for Nietzsche as well (will to power). Obviously, the 
line between the two – historiography and philosophy of history – is not so strict. How one 
writes about the past says a great deal about how one thinks that the past functions, meaning 
that historians are often interested in historiography because it gives us philosophies of 
history. Thus, one can sometimes see Emmanuel Ladurie’s famous Les Paysans de 
Languedoc (1966) in courses on historical theory. Although hyper-empirical (and thus 
supposedly non-speculative), its empiricism gives us an image of historical change: it is 
detailed, local and infinitely complex.  
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In postmodern terms, historical theory or “thought” also shakes-out along these lines. 
On the historiography side are figures such as Hayden White and Dominic LaCapra.10 In fact, 
though, what sets them on the “historiography side” is less that they introduce new modes of 
writing history than that they revealed some interesting things to us about the history of 
historical writing. This was essentially that historical writing bears quite some resemblances 
to literature. This is not the newest idea – history writing and belles lettres were often seen as 
related before the nineteenth century. (And even on its own terms, the “linguistic turn” in 
history is not new. If Hayden White is the benchmark, the linguistic turn would in fact be 
coming up on its thirtieth anniversary. This also makes the “New Historicism” frequently 
discussed in the U.S. and other Anglophone oriented academic cultures not particularly new 
either.)11 However, over the past century and a half, the scientific model for historical 
investigation has been dominant to the point where we almost forget other models. To 
suggest, as did White and LaCapra in the 1970s and ‘80s, that underneath that model we were 
acting out modes of literature was provocative. In many ways, it still is. 
 Nonetheless, when I speak about postmodern historical thought or theory I am more 
interested in postmodern speculative philosophy of history. Indeed, if we may make 
something of a postmodern/Derridian “graphic intervention” here, we might mark the term as 
postmodern (un)speculative philosophy of history. The reason for this is precisely what I 
mentioned a few paragraphs above. Hegel “speculated” on the phenomenology of Spirit. 
Spirit ran through the course of history, and its dialectic was the driving force behind all 
history. He could not be clearer on this point – “Universal History,” he wrote, “belongs to the 
realm of Spirit.”12 Marx, of course, made the metaphysical-material shift and placed the 
burden on forces and relations of production. Spengler – for those who are interested – saw 
history as governed by organic life-processes of birth, flourishment, decline and death. 
Toynbee also viewed history cyclically, although much less pessimistically and in rather more 
moral and religious terms than did Spengler. Nietzsche, if we include him, placed the burden 
of historical change on the “will to power.” Postmodern (un)speculative philosophy of 
history, though, would deny such monocausal views. It would argue that there is no single 
                                                 
10 I should make the caveat here that in White’s case, the relationship with postmodernism is tenuous. 
He uses certain post-structural ideas about narrative and signification. However, he clearly defines 
himself if non-, if not anti-, Foucauldian. See White, “Foucault’s Discourse: The Historiography of 
Anti-Humanism,” in The Content of the Form (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987). 
11 See, for example, S. Greenblatt and K. Gallagher, Practicing the New Historicism (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000). For LaCapra, see History and Criticism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1985). 
12 Hegel, 16. 
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force, mechanism or set of relationships accompanying humanity through time. Rather, its 
“speculation” is that there is a diversity of such mechanisms, and that the ways we engage 
them, think about them and define them are mobile at any rate. Therein, one could say that 
postmodern philosophy of history is philosophy of history and also not – it does not have a 
logical center or normative principle in the manner that philosophies of history usually do. 
However, that fact itself becomes the basis of a certain kind of logic and set of norms. 
 It is unquestionably Foucault who is the most important in this context – he is the 
prime representative when one thinks of a postmodern philosophy of history in the speculative 
mode. For the most conservative historians, this can be a point of contention (especially in the 
Anglo-American world) to the extent that Foucault was and was not a historian. His title at the 
College de France, for example, was “professor of the history of systems of thought.” 
However, he sometimes shied away from being called a historian and went to great pains to 
qualify the degree to which his histories were historical.13 Some historians thus view him as 
more as a sociologist or anthropologist than historian – which is to say that he portrays basic 
social and cultural dynamics rather than offering specific accounts of how specific events and 
circumstances changed over time. However, this view is more symptomatic of historians’ all-
too-frequent antipathy toward philosophy than a reflection of reality. 14 The point for Foucault 
was that basic social, cultural and – we might add – political dynamics were the causes for 
human change over time. 
 However, again, in a typically postmodern manner (if there is such a thing), the 
important element of “these basic social, cultural and political dynamics” is the “s” at the end 
of dynamics; it makes the situation plural. Given that – especially to audiences outside of 
history looking at this paper – Foucault’s basic ideas (especially from his 1970s, middle, 
“genealogical” phase) are well known, I will not devote a great deal of space to rehashing 
them here. However, shortly put, his ideas ping-pong back and forth between a unifying 
concept – power – and the idea that there is no staticizing component to power relationships. 
The following (and famous) lines from Surveiller et Punir (1975) are typical in this regard. 
 
[Power is] dispositions, maneuvers, tactics, techniques, functionings…one should 
decipher it as a network constantly in tension, in activity…one should take as its 
                                                 
13 For an excellent reading of Foucault’s relationship to the French historical community, see G. 
Noriel, “Foucault and History: The Lessons of a Disillusion,” Journal of Modern History 66, no. 3 
(1994), 547-68. 
14 For the formative piece of this kind of criticism in the Anglo-American world, see A. Megill, 
“Foucault, Structuralism and the Ends of History,” Journal of Modern History 51, no. 3 (1979), 451-
503. 
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model perpetual battle rather than a contract regulating a transaction or the conquest 
of a territory…This means that these relations go right down into the depths of 
society, that they are not localized in the relations between the state and its citizens or 
on the frontier between classes and that they do not merely reproduce, at the level of 
individuals, bodies, gestures and behaviour, the general form of law or 
government…they are not univocal; they define innumerable points of confrontation, 
focuses of instability, each of which has its own risks of conflict, of struggles and of 
an at least temporary inversion of the power relations.15 
 
The point to take away from this passage is simply that there was no “meta” level of power 
relationships for Foucault. Surely, the play of power in society – exertions of force and acts of 
coercion – is a given; that makes it normative, to a degree. However, the manner in which this 
play unfolds is utterly unpredictable. It pervades all social, political, cultural, economic and 
even personal relationships. One domain of power relationships could not be privileged over 
another. Relations of production, to pick on Marx for a moment, might be important, but no 
more so than any other social or economic relationship. The point was that the field of power 
– the space in which power plays – formed an incontestable regime. That is not to say that 
specific formulations and practices of power could not be resisted; of course they could. It is 
to say, though, that even such resistances are part of the logic of power. Power itself cannot 
be dispensed with. It cannot be combated on a universal scale because its operations are 
mutatable and mobile. We might decide to use it in certain ways – to manipulate it and take 
advantage of its presence at certain locales – but those were different tasks than being able to 
control it completely and exert mastery over its logos. 
 It is this point that makes Foucault interesting for historical theory. On one hand (even 
though I said that I was leaving it behind), it makes him interesting for historiography 
because it leads Foucault to make a historiographical charge: speaking globally about the past 
is impossible. The historian’s task is to patiently follow back the mutations of a particular 
strand of relationships within the field of power. This was Foucault’s notion of genealogy, 
which he borrowed from Nietzsche (Zur Genealogie der Moral, 1887). Larger 
characterizations – e.g. periodizations, zeitgeists – were outside of the scope of historical 
analysis. This contradicted even Foucault’s own earlier projects in the form of archeology. 
The book that made him famous – Les Mots et les Choses (1966) – was such an attempt at 
periodization. Historical writing, he later charged, however, had to be detailed, archival and, 
most importantly, always take the present as its starting point. 
 More important for our purposes, though, is that Foucault’s notions of the un-
masterability of power made his ideas on history (un)speculative philosophy of history par 
                                                 
15 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, tr. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1979), 27. 
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excellence. In part, this was because his speculation on what drove human change over time 
was not all that speculative – that humans enter into relationships with one another and that 
those relationships involve effecting one another was tantamount to asserting that the 
movement of the individual in the world was different than it might be if there was only one 
individual. That is to say that Foucault simply asserted that we are not fully self-
determinatory. This hardly amounts to a speculation – such has been the assertion of every 
speculative philosophy of history. Thus, it was the lack of speculation – the emphasis on the 
local relationship and its mobility – that made Foucault interesting. These can still be difficult 
concept for us to digest. The meaning structures – the need to have a thesis and significance – 
of historical scholarship almost demands a signification of the meta. That we would dispense 
with meaning structures in historical analysis meant a complete reformulation of our 
historical imaginations and possibilities, both for the historian and the public at-large. As 
mentioned earlier, this was in some ways the ultimate historical philosophy; it was utterly 
non-philosophical and completely historical, or concerned with the past itself. The question, 
however, is whether or not historians were really ready to engage the promise of the 
pragmatism to which we were supposedly so committed. 
 However, this was and was not the point for Foucault. For one, as much of the 
pragmatist lineage from Dewey to Rorty would argue, pragmatism does not mean the loss of 
ethical discourses or normative socio-political formations. Thus, “pragmatism,” as such, was 
not the issue. The issue was, though, historical liberation; liberation through a reformulation 
of ethics and the opening of social structure. This might be news to some about Foucault, but 
it is a well-recognized point by now. That is simply to say that two elements intrigued 
Foucault about power. One was its localism and unpredictability. The other was its 
productivity. This was not only in the sense of producing history, but also in the sense of the 
progressive possibilities raised by recognizing power and – as much as possible – consciously 
and strategically maneuvering in its field. The false promises of history, argued Foucault, 
were the promises of the meta, of transcendence and of a utopian point of historical arrival. 
These were, at best, nothing more than incidental concepts emerging from power structures of 
discourse that bore no resemblance to reality. At worst, they were excuses for long and brutal 
histories of intellectual, political, social and cultural nihilism. Power relationships, however, 
were not unidirectional. We could resist nihilistic invocations of power and develop an ethics 
in which power was tempered. By understanding power’s dynamics, argued Foucault, we 
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might create a situation in which power games “were played to a minimum of domination.”16 
This was the point of the last two volumes of his History of Sexuality (1980-84). We might 
choose, as he put it in an interview from that period, to find “a new tone, a new way of 
looking, a new way of doing.” People who did so, he argued, “will never feel the need to 
lament that the world is in error [and] that history is filled with people of no consequence.”17 
 In essence, such statements amount to the fact that, taken as whole, Foucault’s thought 
takes a strange turn – a bit of the utopic seeps into the field of a thinker who supposedly 
oriented himself against such things. That is to say that Foucault exposes himself as a bit of a 
dreamer. He argues that the world might become a better place through adopting a new mode 
of social (heavily imbued with linguistic and political) consciousness. This is not unusual for 
postmodern discourse. In 1967, for example, Derrida wrote that signs of this new mode of 
consciousness were “finding liberation all over the world” (although it was more linguistic 
than social consciousness that he had in mind).18 Although Derrida long remained apolitical 
as to the meaning of this point, he eventually revealed it – and in more concrete terms than 
did Foucault. This came in The Politics of Friendship (1994). What we opened ourselves to 
under this new mode of consciousness, he asserted, was “the ‘come’ of a certain 
democracy.”19 The importance of this statement, one that reflects currently popular notions of 
democracy held by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, is that it indicates that democracy 
demands resistance, and not simply in the form of a “loyal opposition.” It demands and can 
include radical resistance. Therein, democracy can never be a fixed state. As Mouffe phrased 
it, the value of imagining democracy in this manner is that it “refuses the objective of 
unanimity and homogeneity which is always revealed as fictitious and based on acts of 
exclusion.”20 This was democracy in the sense of truly hearing from the demos, and allowing 
them to act. By this measure, concepts of society that do not allow for multi-directional 
exercises of power and see power at its very heart are not democratic. Reconceptions of 
democracy in the postmodern vein, as Derrida phrased it, “mixed in with the breath, with the 
respiration, of the very ‘spirit’ of promise.”21 
                                                 
16 Foucualt, “The Ethic of Care of the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” in The Final Foucault, ed. James 
Bernauer and David Rasmussen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 18. 
17 Foucault, “The Masked Philosopher,” in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other 
Writings, 1977-1984 (New York: Routledge, 1988), 330. 
18 J. Derrida, Of Grammtology, tr. Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1995), 4. 
19 Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, tr. George Collins (New York: Verso, 1997), 306. 
20 C. Mouffe, “Democracy, Power and the Political,” in Democracy and Difference, ed. Seyla 
Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 247. 
21 Derrida, The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe, tr. Pasack-Anne Brault and Michael B. 
Naas (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 6. 
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 The point is, then, that Foucault especially, but also other important postmodern 
figures, support the Havel-esque notion of the postmodern age as a semi-utopic point of 
arrival. What is more – although it opens up a whole other can of worms – they also saw the 
possibility of these ideas as having become historical realities. Precisely when is difficult to 
say; Foucault’s hints along these lines are only hints. His famous “man disappearing like a 
face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea” comment at the end of The Order of Things is 
probably the most well known. The postmodern age – the end of “unified man” – was upon 
us, he seemed to suggest in 1966. “Diverse man,” if we may call it that, was about to come. 
Derrida’s 1967 comment about the “liberation” of a new linguistic mode from Of 
Grammatology has the same ring to it, although he did not become more concrete about the 
issue until after the fall of the Eastern Bloc. Nonetheless, the strange role of the utopic in their 
theories of history is clear. On the one hand, they argue that history is propelled by difference 
and power, and that is a highly unphilosohical, neutral point. Moreover, that fact should make 
us look at history unphilosophically and in the absence of imposed meaning structures. On 
the other hand, though, difference and power also delivered history, at least to a certain 
extent. It was not delivered to utopia in the sense of utopia as the fully perfect society. 
However, it was delivered to the utopic – an improving society that could approximate 
perfection, as it happens, by declaiming the idea. In this, Havel – as well as a slew of other 
cultural prognosticators – would have agreed. This was precisely the “atmosphere of tolerant 
solidarity and unity in diversity based on…genuine pluralism and parallelism” that Havel 
referred to and that – I think – many of us wanted to believe we had after 1991.22 Thus, while 
it is true that analyses of the September 11 attacks in the United States and the ever-
increasing violence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are still emerging and that we are too 
much in the midst of those events to say what they represent historically in any assured 
manner, if we are even the least bit right in asserting a shift in attitude relating to difference – 
that we had a sense of increasing comfort and positivity in relation the idea that has been 
revoked– Foucault’s (as well as Derrida’s and Lyotard’s) theories of history become 
problematic. From an analytical standpoint, anyway, they betray their purpose. They become 
something other than “gray, meticulous and patiently documentary.” They do not provide the 
space for the historical unfolding of the postmodern age that seems to surround us at the 
present moment. 
 
                                                 
22 Havel, cf. footnote 2. 
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III. 
Who, then, are our alternatives? That is to say that if Foucault, Derrida or Lyotard are unable 
to explain our current historical state of historical affairs, who can, especially in relation to 
conceptions of difference and the utopic? It would seem that we are not left with many 
options. One might say, for example, that we should move to historical pessimism; somebody 
like Nietzsche or Spengler, for example. Surely, such gloomy views of history would explain 
the dismaying surfacing of the dystopic in the midst of world historical situations that allowed 
us a moment with the utopic. However, in the first place, this is a false (although common) 
reading of Nietzsche. He is, of course, highly critical about the course of human history (or at 
least Western history) into his own age (the late 19th century). And his mode of criticism is 
complex; his relationship to ideas of will and power, a bit like Foucault’s, was double-edged. 
However, even previous to Foucault, he was hardly the only historical critic. To not imagine 
Marx as a historical critic, for example, is to not imagine Marx. And while we might 
recognize Marx as a great historical critic, it would be rare to call him a historical pessimist. 
The same should be the case for Nietzsche. Nietzsche, albeit in a much more complicated 
manner than Marx, maintained a powerful vision of historical liberation. Such is the meaning 
of his refrains toward “eternity,” the “woman he loves” at the end of Also Sprach Zarathustra 
(1884-88).23 (Beyond that, if we are thrown into looking a figures like Spengler – the early 
twentieth century German thinker whose book Der Untergang des Abenlandes (1918-22) was 
enormously popular on the heels of another historical crisis period – we have real problems. 
Spengler’s pessimism was that Western culture had entered the last phase of its life-cycle; 
that its “soul,” as he phrased it, was dying out and coming into decline with the rise of 
mechanization and technology. However, the problem here is that we are not so concerned 
with the “decline” [untergang] of a civilization – especially since the question is not “this 
civilization” versus “that” in terms of who might “win” or remain on the historical stage – 
although, while that is not our question presently, it does seem to be one of the bases for our 
discomfort in relation to the idea of difference. Rather, the problem is more analytical. The 
question is how can we imagine certain foldings and unfoldings in relation to the idea of 
difference, or the reorganization of our mentality in relation to the concept in terms levels of 
                                                 
23 Expressed more prosaicly, this “eternity,” wrote Nietzsche, will “redeem us not only from the 
hitherto reigning ideal but also from that which was bound to grow out of it…the will to nothingness, 
nihilism; this bell-stroke of noon and of the great decision that liberates the will again and restores its 
goal to the earth and his hope to man…this victory over God and nothingness – must come one day.” 
See The Genealogy of Morals, tr. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1989), 96. 
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comfortability; we are not, in fact, talking about the enormous historical edifices of 
“civilizations,” but the finer, more multiplicatus points of “culture.”)24 
This question of alternatives thus takes us out of the domain of historical pessimism 
and puts us into the problem of radicalizing postmodern historical thought or genuinely 
realizing its possibilities. As I see it, anyway, that means giving an edge to Foucault’s 
conception of power such that it might not close and power somehow become “less 
powerful,” as he seemed to suggest that it might in the latter stages of his career. It is in this 
sense that I would offer the figure of Georges Bataille (1897-1962), a precursor to Foucault 
(Foucault edited the first volume of Bataille’s Œuvres Complétes, 1977-88) who presaged 
Foucault’s conception of power yet maintained it in a more radical formulation. This was 
especially as a means for conceptualizing difference. Bataille maintained a vision of history 
that, like Foucault’s, called for a dynamicization and infinite exponentialization of the field of 
power; that is, beyond just the frontiers of classes or states and publics. However, the 
consequences for this dynamicization and exponentialization were more dangerous and 
unclear for Bataille than they were for Foucault. 
The central text in this regard is Bataille’s three-volume work La parte maudite 
(1949-54). Today, the most read volume of the work is the self-titled first volume (the other 
two volumes, in order, are entitled Histoire Eroticisme and Souverainité). In their own day, 
very few people read these books. Previous to their publication, Bataille had been known for 
his involvement (by way of opposition) with the Surrealists in the 1920s and ‘30s and as the 
author of the scandalous fiction Histoire de l’Oeil (1920); outside of the small but famous 
Parisian avant-garde in the inter-war years there was yet smaller avant-garde calling attention 
to what they saw are the dangerous, highly modern and normative standards often invoked by 
the political and artistic far left. Bataille was part of this smallest of avant-gardes, a point 
which he expressed through the ultra-realistic and hyper-pornographic Histoire de l’Oeil as 
well as through anti-Surrealist essays in the journal Documents. Documents had a short life, 
however, and Histoire de l’Oeil was first banned, and then never sold well until after 
Bataille’s death. So as Surrealism fell out of primacy in the art world – especially in the wake 
of the Second World War – Bataille moved on to other things; La parte maudite was one of 
them. Indeed, Bataille went to his death-bed thinking that its three books were his most 
important; time may well bear him out. They are, as one of his long-time friends observed, 
                                                 
24 This also, to my mind, discounts Huntington’s book. 
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Bataille’s attempt to write a “universal history.”25 Within them we get a vision of history, a 
theory of history, that is just coming to light and may well prove central to the first years of 
the new millennium. 
The reason for this projected importance is his concept of souverainité. It is the case 
that Bataille worked within a small circle of terminology in La parte maudite; in addition to 
souverainité, excés, transgression and dépense [expenditure] were also key concepts – and 
we can see by these concepts the post-Surrealist milieu to which Bataille was attached. 
However, souverainité was the lynch-pin. This was, on one hand, sovereignty as we 
traditionally understand it – more or less the power of self-governance. However, what this 
meant was a bit complicated and a bit Nietzschean. It meant, as Bataille phrased it, man’s 
vision of himself outside the bounds of “utility.”26 This meant outside economies, 
governmental or bureaucratic systems and social systems – anything that would tie us to 
logics of necessity or grant us anything other than full, self-contained self-mastery. It was an 
essentially mystical or theological vision of the self; Bataille himself termed it “atheological.” 
It was man in relationship to God but faced with (as Bataille saw it) the fact that there was no 
god. It was the self as godhead; it was the self as master ruler in a manner that tread far 
beyond, for example, anything in Rousseau’s or Hobbe’s ideas of sovereignty. 
Conjoining souverainité to one of the other terms that were important for Bataille, 
however, he took this vision of the self to be quite natural. We might take it as highly 
exceptional, or the property of pseudo-Surrealist fantasies. However, for Bataille, it was a 
matter, as he put it, of the “economy [of] the circulation of energy on the Earth,” or what he 
also called “general economy.”27 Moving straight to a pseudo-metaphysical principle “the 
living organism,” he determined, “ordinarily receives more energy than is necessary for 
maintaining life.”28 It is therefore, he argued, that systems grow. That much we might agree 
with – they seem to do so. It was also therefore that we were bound to the excessive (excés, 
term number two). It was the basis for life in all its forms. And, because man as opposed to 
other animals was sentient, it became the basis for the operations of human consciousness. 
For Bataille, the evidence for this was simply a matter of even the most cursory 
glances at human history; this is largely what brings him into conjunction with Foucault. It 
                                                 
25 See J. Piel, ““Bataille and the World: From ‘The Notion of Expenditure’ to The Accursed Share,” in 
On Bataille: Critical Essays, ed. Leslie-Ann Boldt-Irons (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), 97. 
26 G. Bataille, The Accursed Share, vols. 2 & 3, tr. Robert Hurley (New York: Zone, 1995), 198. In 
English translation, volumes 2 and 3 of this text are bound together. 
27 Bataille, The Accursed Share [vol. 1], tr. Robert Hurley (New York: Zone, 1988), 19. 
28 Ibid., 21. 
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was not just, as Hegel put it, that human history was not a “theater of happiness.” The 
problem was that human history was drenched in blood, abjection, sacrifice and 
marginalization and that these, even, were bound to human history on its positive side in its 
juissance, creativity and uniqueness. In the context of art history, this was the point of one of 
Bataille’s other later works Eroticisme (1957) (which was reviewed by Sartre) and of a long 
historical narrative within La parte maudite that space demands do not allow me to fully 
account here.29 However, what this suggested to Bataille was that human history was more 
than a system, even though the consistent role of sovereignty and excess made it something of 
one. It was a set of unpredictable actions based on multiple individual visions of sovereignty 
and their urging-on by the economics of excess. The systematic play of these concepts was 
not hermetic – it was a matter of dépense (term number three), or the use of excess energy. 
This was energy that, as Bataille put it, “must necessarily be lost without profit; it must be 
spent, willingly or not, gloriously or catastrophically.”30 
The manner in which we made these expenditures is what made us historical, or gave 
us the impetus to change over time. It is this that thus makes Bataille, like Foucault, relevant 
to speculative philosophies of history – or (un)speculative, if we are attaching them to the 
postmodern milieu. To invoke the last of Bataille’s central terms, expenditure was a matter of 
transgression. That is to say that the odd thing about human consciousness under the 
realization of the roles of sovereignty, excess and expenditure in human history is that it 
revealed our reliance on heterology. In other words, it revealed how our development of 
hermetic systems, be they capitalism, communism or any other, relied our imagination of 
ourselves outside their boundaries. Political and economic behaviors and systems were not 
truths whose destinies were working themselves out over time. They were locations of retreat 
from the exigency of expenditure. Expenditure was an exhaustive process – though we might 
all imagine ourselves as grand kings, warriors or artists, the demands of human life meant 
pulling back from the frontiers of extreme expression from time to time. We had to construct 
systems that would generate the capital that we could then expend in order to have the 
excessive and sovereign experience. This meant the establishment of social power structures 
and discourses. Sovereignty, after all, included competition. Most of us, held Bataille, did not 
imagine multiple sovereigns; we alone were to be sovereign. This was the cause of hermetic 
                                                 
29 For an account of this narrative though, see my “The Accursed Share: Georges Bataille as Historical 
Thinker,” Critical Horizons 3, no. 1. 
30 Ibid. 
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social, economic and political systems and ideologies. They were to limit the sovereignty of 
some while sustaining that of others. 
The point for Bataille, though, was the transgressiveness of this situation. While we 
existed within the bordlerlines of particular systems in our day-to-day life, we did not in our 
minds. Indeed, here was the real power of the sovereign imagination: our vision of life 
outside our prescribed social borderlines, behaviors and norms is precisely what kept us 
inside of them. Thinking ethnographically and along class lines, Bataille charged that in the 
modern world, “the privileges of race and class are indefensible, and they are the only ones 
that find defenders!”31 Politically, he captured a strange tendency in modern Western history 
– the oft-surprising allegiance of the working classes and socially “low” with bourgeois and 
landed parties. It took quite some daring and imagination to intervene against dominant 
discourses, institutions and norms. The exigencies of consciousness generally ensured our 
obedience. 
However, this was by definition also not completely the case. This fact played itself 
out in two ways. First, in the competition for sovereignty, lines of difference were bound to 
be drawn – and drawn variously. À la Foucault, they would be drawn along the lines of class, 
states, ethnicity, gender as well as interpersonally; that is to say, along all possible lines of 
identity difference. However, at the level of what Bataille referred to as “history properly 
speaking” – meaning political history – class conflict and conflicts between state and public 
became very real. We made and broke alliances along shifting lines of common experiences 
and interests. Therein, history had revolutionary moments – moments of dramatic 
institutional and ideological change. However, those “in power” also disobeyed; which is 
essentially to say that they transgressed the very standards that supported their own power not 
only psychologically but also behaviorally. This was – like the evidence for excés – also a 
relatively simple matter of history for Bataille; it was the history of war, acts of violence on 
the part of the rulers toward the ruled and upper class luxury. Transgression brought with it 
the realities of difference. We might establish discourses that either pretended its non-
existence or insisted on its overcoming, or pretended that its incorporation – our gaining 
consciousness of it – prevented its effects from being fully deleterious and led to our 
acceptance of multiple assertions of sovereignty. However, those discourses themselves, 
discourses such as Havel’s “unity in diversity,” would be just that to Bataille – discourses. 
They were, under the surface, informed and guided by visions of sovereignty themselves. 
                                                 
31 The Accursed Share, vols. 2 & 3, 169. 
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They were discourses that emerged out of particular places and particular circumstances., 
which is to say that “unity in diversity” might be a product of a long, Euro-centric, neo-liberal 
intellectual history. This tied it to the history of the “glorious or catastrophic” displays that 
made Euro-centrism and neo-liberalism hold good – this was essentially the history of wars 
and bourgeois excess. Ideas such as “unity in diversity” could only be a façade in that case. If 
we could contact the deepest parts of our psychology, we would know that was so. The utopic 
was clearly a part of the human imagination. However, what we imagined was utopia for 
ourselves, or perhaps those who we considered as similar to ourselves. And history showed us 
only too well the costs and realities of trying to attain those utopias. We knew, therefore, that 
dystopia lurked around every corner of our socialized and temporalized existences. 
As his dates would indicate, Bataille was a product of the modern. Two world wars 
and the rise of fascism (which he virulently opposed) took their toll on Bataille’s psyche as it 
did many others. In fact, though, what worried Bataille most was the emerging Cold War and, 
at least in the West, the strengthening of liberalistic vocabularies, practices and ideologies. 
These concerns have large play in the first volume of La parte maudite. The problem was not 
that fascism had (more or less) died out, but that there would arise a new, uncontestable 
discursive regime of freedom – that the world was now about choice, the possibilities of the 
individual, participation and democracy. We could be told that we had sovereignty, that under 
the victory of liberal democracy and capitalism, we were self-masters. To prove it, we would 
be bathed in the opulent. Access to material luxuries would increase, technology would allow 
people to leave the industrial workplace and we would all be given some of the trappings and 
affectations of the upper class. In the emerging competition with the Soviet Union, Bataille 
argued, this is what the Marshall Plan was intended to do for Europe – help with recovery 
such that Europe might have the base for such a socio-economic take-off (we can argue with 
Bataille, but this was his analysis, anyway). This is certainly a large part of what the Truman 
and Eisenhower years were about in the United States. Under these conditions, he posited, 
conformity and materialism would be hard to combat; why would we want to? Thus, we 
might say that we were establishing the conditions for individual liberation, but it was not 
hard to see that this was not so. Most of us, posited Bataille, were simply succumbing to 
discourses and powers – a regime, really – larger than ourselves. 
The most dangerous part of the establishment of this regime, however, is that it 
provided the means and justifications to work quickly and effectively against claims that 
“I/we are different” and “I/we do not agree.” For one, in such regimes, such assertions, if they 
were to be heard, needed to be made dramatically. An intifada or terrorist bombing would, in 
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fact, fit the bill nicely – something that exposed the alterior excess that we know is present in 
world systems but we refuse to admit. Responses, though, would be swift and complex. They 
would come in the defense of free expression and political pluralism, accompanied by the 
might of the world’s most powerful late industrial economies. Resistance to such responses 
could only take the form of a long, tactical struggle. It is a good question whether this makes 
Bataille modern or postmodern. However, his vision clearly becomes transferable to 
postmodern times, as well as picks up on the promise of postmodern historical thought. That 
promise, at least in part, was demonstrating the two-way functioning of power – recognizing 
that it works on us and that we may work against it (that is to say, we may exercise it 
ourselves). Bataille recognized the exigencies of this claim. He tells us that we can and should 
recognize the constructed nature of any variety of claim to “unity in diversity” and the 
assertion of the utopic out of its renunciation. To do otherwise, he argues, is to deny diversity 
in its immanence and to deny the difference of differences that accompany us in our 
imaginations of souverainité. 
I might conclude, then, with the following remarks. Analytically, it seems to me, 
Bataille is right – at least at the level of what we can and cannot afford. We cannot deny the 
differentiating nature of difference because it is real and its effects – as they are now – can be 
violent and dangerous. We remain blind to these dangers if we claim to overcome difference, 
even through its embrace. What is worse, we are able to pretend that violence prosecuted as a 
result of difference does not exist as we are able to fit it into the space of a grand narrative of 
universality. This then faces us with a political question – how can we, or even should we, 
stem the tide of dystopic turns in relation to difference? Here I think that Bataille provides 
some interesting possibilities as well. We must remember that he suggested the excesses of 
political economy that drive conflict to be a matter of “glorious or catastrophic” expenditure. 
The relationship he proposes between the two – glory and catastrophe – is unclear, although 
he seems to suggest that the line between them is thin, yet present. In the globalized world, 
there is no reason not to extend and struggle on behalf of our own sovereign vision – that the 
excesses of the powers that organize the world be spent gloriously rather than catastrophically 
and, equally importantly, we stop confusing the two categories. After all, at least if Bataille is 
right, it is out of this confusion that the realities of catastrophe become discourses of glory, 
and that we then become blind to those who lay in catastrophe’s path. 
 
 
 
